RED NOTICE EMPIRE China’s Global Repression Through INTERPOL Part 6: The Turkey File – China’s Transnational Operations

8 Temmuz 2026 China Intelligence & Security Watch

In the cross-border repression strategy developed by China over the last two decades, Turkey holds a distinctive position—not only in terms of diplomatic relations but also regarding the East Turkestan issue. Serving as a strategic transit hub between Europe and Asia, Turkey is recognized as one of the countries closely monitored by the Beijing administration, as it hosts one of the largest Uyghur diasporas in the world.

Although there are no official statistics, academic studies and evaluations by international human rights organizations indicate that tens of thousands of Uyghur Turks reside in Turkey. İstanbul, in particular, has become one of the most prominent settlement hubs for Uyghurs forced to leave East Turkestan in recent years. This situation transforms Turkey from merely a country of asylum into a focal point for China’s transnational security policies.

As explored in previous chapters, international investigations have revealed that the Chinese Communist Party has developed a multi-layered mechanism of oppression targeting individuals abroad, extending well beyond its own borders. Within this mechanism, Interpol Red Notices, diplomatic initiatives, bilateral extradition requests, surveillance of the diaspora, pressure exerted through family members, and, in some cases, allegations of attempts to establish informant networks are evaluated collectively.

The China Targets investigation, led by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) alongside joint reports from various media outlets, suggests that China utilizes unofficial methods in tandem with official legal channels to track targeted individuals abroad and force them to return to China. The research notes that these activities span numerous countries across Asia, Europe, North America, and the Middle East, with Turkey emerging as a critical node in this global network.

For Beijing, Turkey is strategically vital not only because it hosts a large population of Uyghur Turks, but also due to its geopolitical position opening up to Europe, historical ties, and regional influence. Consequently, court records, official statements, and international investigations made public have documented that Chinese authorities have submitted numerous extradition requests to Turkey over the years, utilized Interpol channels for certain individuals, and engaged in various diplomatic initiatives.

China’s Turkey Strategy: A Multi-Layered Oppression Mechanism Beyond the Red Notice

When analyzing China’s activities targeting Uyghurs and other designated groups living abroad, it becomes evident that Beijing deploys a multi-layered strategy that is not confined solely to the Interpol Red Notice system. International research demonstrates that the Beijing administration simultaneously utilizes a diverse array of tools, ranging from diplomatic maneuvers and intelligence operations to economic leverage and psychological pressure exerted through family members. Turkey stands out as one of the primary hubs of this strategy, driven by both its sizable Uyghur diaspora and its geopolitical positioning.

The China Targets investigation by the ICIJ revealed that China targets individuals living in various countries around the world not only through formal judicial processes, but frequently through informal, parallel methods. According to the investigation, Interpol Red Notices cease to be mere legal instruments in certain cases, serving instead as components of a broader mechanism of coercion. This mechanism is reinforced by diplomatic engagements, direct cooperation between security agencies, pressure placed on family members, and attempts to isolate targeted individuals economically or socially.

Turkey occupies a unique place in this strategy. From China’s perspective, Turkey is not just a nation harboring a vast Uyghur Turkic population; it is also viewed as a crucial transit gateway to Europe and a central hub where diaspora activities are heavily concentrated. Therefore, public documents and court files confirm that the Beijing government has conveyed numerous extradition requests to Turkish authorities over the years, leveraged Interpol channels against specific individuals, and intervened at the diplomatic level.

Diplomatic Pressure and Extradition Requests

Extradition requests form the most visible pillar of China’s operational model in Turkey. Files prepared by Chinese authorities—particularly regarding individuals alleged to be involved in terrorism, separatism, or threatening public safety—have been forwarded to Turkish authorities via Interpol channels and bilateral diplomatic contacts. Conversely, human rights organizations have warned that a significant portion of these accusations are political in nature, putting individuals at risk of torture, arbitrary detention, or unfair trial if returned to China.

Consequently, numerous cases in Turkey have triggered judicial reviews and individual appeal processes. In evaluating China’s extradition requests, key legal benchmarks have emerged, most notably the right to life, the prohibition of torture, and the principle of non-refoulement (the practice of not forcing refugees or asylum seekers to return to a country in which they are liable to be subjected to persecution).

Pressure Exerted Through Family Members

One of the most striking findings on which international investigations converge is the allegation that Uyghurs living abroad are subjected to pressure through their family members remaining in China. Numerous testimonies documented by human rights organizations and journalistic investigations suggest that the parents, siblings, or other close relatives of individuals living abroad are interrogated by security forces, coerced into making contact, or subjected to various sanctions.

This method is evaluated as a strategy aimed at placing psychological pressure on the targeted individual not directly, but through their family. According to research, this coercion is, in some instances, accompanied by demands for the individual to cease their activities, share information, or return to China.

Informant Networks and Diaspora Surveillance

The China Targets investigation by the ICIJ, along with research conducted by Deutsche Welle, Der Spiegel, and other media partners, also featured allegations that China attempts to establish networks to gather intelligence within diaspora communities in certain countries. These investigations relay testimonies indicating that some individuals were offered money, pressured via the safety of their families, or forced to share information through various other methods.

Furthermore, the research alleges that the social circles, association activities, and public advocacy efforts of Uyghurs living abroad are closely monitored, with the gathered information forwarded to Chinese security authorities. A portion of these findings later became a subject of debate in certain judicial investigations conducted in Turkey.

Allegations of Police Cooperation and the Security Dimension

Debates surrounding China’s cross-border activities are not limited solely to diplomatic initiatives. According to information reflected in the international press and certain judicial files, there are allegations that Chinese security units attempt to establish contacts at various levels with local law enforcement or security institutions in different countries. However, the scope and nature of these contacts vary from country to country.

When examining information made public regarding Turkey, it appears that China occasionally makes requests for security cooperation, requests information sharing about certain individuals, and attempts to expedite extradition processes. Conversely, files reviewed by the Turkish judiciary indicate that each application is evaluated individually, particularly taking into account obligations within the framework of international human rights law.

The Model Applied in Turkey

The emerging picture demonstrates that China’s operational model in Turkey does not consist of a single method. On the contrary, Interpol Red Notices, diplomatic pressure, extradition requests, allegations of diaspora surveillance, psychological pressure exerted through family members, and attempts to establish informant networks are viewed as different elements of the same overarching strategy.

This multi-layered structure makes the Turkey dossier one of the most remarkable examples of China’s global mechanism of transnational repression. One of the most prominent and long-running examples of this mechanism in Turkey is the case of Abdulkadir Yapçan, which has been closely monitored by international legal circles for years.

The Abdulkadir Yapçan Dossier: China’s Longest-Running Extradition Battle in Turkey

When discussing China’s cross-border activities in Turkey, one of the names that comes to the fore most frequently is undoubtedly Abdulkadir Yapçan. Spanning nearly a quarter of a century, this case is considered one of China’s most noteworthy cases in terms of the Interpol Red Notice system, diplomatic initiatives, international protection mechanisms, judicial processes in Turkey, and human rights law.

Beyond being a mere extradition request, the Yapçan case serves as an important example demonstrating how China utilizes international legal instruments, how Turkey approaches these requests, and how international human rights mechanisms intervene in this process.

The Process Beginning in East Turkestan

According to official statements from China, Abdulkadir Yapçan was among the individuals wanted on charges of “membership in a terrorist organization” and “separatist activities.” Chinese authorities claimed that Yapçan carried out armed activities in East Turkestan and was linked to various attacks.

In response, Yapçan and his lawyers argued that the accusations were political in nature and that he was targeted due to the policies directed against Uyghurs in East Turkestan. International human rights organizations have also been stating for many years that the charges of “terrorism” and “separatism” directed by China, particularly against Uyghur activists, need to be independently examined.

Consequently, within international legal circles, the Yapçan dossier began to be cited not merely as a criminal investigation, but as one of the cases alleged to carry political motives.

Arrival in Turkey and the Asylum Process

Leaving China and spending many years in different countries, Yapçan eventually arrived in Turkey. Since Turkey has been one of the most important centers for the Uyghur diaspora for many years due to historical and cultural ties, Yapçan began his life here.

However, the process pursued against him by Chinese authorities did not end with his arrival in Turkey. On the contrary, the Beijing administration continued its initiatives to ensure Yapçan’s capture and extradition to China by activating international mechanisms.

The 2003 Interpol Red Notice

The most critical development that lent the dossier an international dimension was the issuance of a Red Notice against Yapçan through the Interpol system in 2003, at the request of China.

While China based its Red Notice request on terrorism charges, human rights defenders argued that the accusations carried political content and that the Interpol mechanism should not be used for political purposes.

This debate was not limited solely to the Yapçan case in the following years. The ICIJ’s China Targets investigation and other international journalistic works brought together numerous examples showing that China utilized similar methods against Uyghurs, dissidents, and businesspeople living in different countries.

Intervention of United Nations Protection Mechanisms

One of the turning points in the Yapçan dossier was the involvement of United Nations human rights mechanisms in the process.

Within the scope of the relevant mechanisms of the United Nations and the principle of non-refoulement in international human rights law, assessments were made indicating that if Yapçan were sent to China, he could be exposed to the risk of torture, ill-treatment, or an unfair trial.

In international law, this principle is recognized as one of the fundamental protection mechanisms that prohibits the forced return of a person to a country where there is a serious risk of human rights violations. Therefore, the Yapçan case became a matter directly concerning not only Turkey’s domestic law but also the international conventions to which it is a party.

China’s Ongoing Extradition Pressure

According to the international press, court files, and reports from human rights organizations, Chinese authorities made various attempts over the years for Yapçan’s extradition from Turkey.

These initiatives were not confined merely to Interpol records. Diplomatic contacts, official correspondence, and requests for cooperation in the field of security were also viewed as parts of the process. Human rights organizations, on the other hand, pointed to the Yapçan dossier as one of the significant examples of China’s broader policy aimed at bringing back Uyghur activists abroad.

Detentions in Turkey and the Legal Process

Abdulkadir Yapçan was detained in Turkey at various times based on requests originating from China. Each detention process triggered intense debates in both public opinion and legal circles.

While his defense attorneys argued that Yapçan would face severe risks regarding his right to life and the absolute prohibition of torture if sent to China, human rights organizations called on Turkey to uphold its international obligations and refrain from extraditing him.

At every stage, the courts evaluated the dossier not only in terms of the accusations presented by China but also within the overarching framework of international human rights law.

The Constitutional Court Process

One of the most critical phases of the dossier was the rulings issued by the Constitutional Court (AYM) of the Republic of Turkey.

In its evaluations within the scope of individual applications, the AYM took into account the allegations that sending Yapçan to China could lead to irreparable consequences regarding his right to life and the prohibition of torture, subsequently issuing interim injunctions at various stages.

Evaluating Turkey’s ratified international conventions alongside the Constitutional provisions regarding the right to life and the prohibition of ill-treatment, the Court emphasized that deportation procedures must be subject to judicial oversight.

These rulings became the subject of landmark assessments, not only for the Yapçan case itself but also for other deportation and extradition requests originating from China.

Why Did Turkey Not Extradit Him?

Despite a legal battle spanning more than two decades, Abdulkadir Yapçan was never extradited to China.

The primary reason for this was that Turkish courts and high judicial bodies seriously evaluated the assertions that he faced risks of torture, ill-treatment, or an unfair trial if returned to China. This approach was grounded in a legal framework fully compliant with international obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights, the United Nations Convention Against Torture, and the principle of non-refoulement.

Today, the Abdulkadir Yapçan dossier is remembered as one of the longest-running extradition attempts pursued by China using the Interpol mechanism and diplomatic channels. Simultaneously, it remains one of the most prominent examples showcasing the delicate balance Turkey attempts to maintain between international human rights law and the security or extradition demands arriving from Beijing.

However, the Yapçan case constitutes only the visible face of China’s activities in Turkey. International journalistic investigations and certain judicial inquiries conducted within Turkey reveal that Beijing does not content itself merely with extradition requests; allegations concerning intelligence gathering within the diaspora, surveillance activities, and the creation of paid informant networks have also come to the fore.

What Deutsche Welle and the ICIJ Uncovered: Surveillance, Informant Allegations, and Family Pressure in Turkey

The most striking findings regarding China’s activities in Turkey have been brought to public attention in recent years through joint efforts by international investigative journalism projects and media outlets. In particular, investigations published by Deutsche Welle (DW) and the China Targets project led by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) detailed allegations that the Beijing administration does not rely solely on diplomatic and legal mechanisms, but deploys a far more comprehensive model of coercion over diaspora communities.

The information featured in these investigations is based on assertions that certain Uyghurs living in Turkey are forced to provide information by individuals allegedly linked to Chinese security units, subjected to pressure through their family members, and that attempts are made to cultivate an informant network within the diaspora. A significant portion of these findings is not limited to testimonies alone; they have also been reflected in judicial investigations and police reports conducted in Turkey.

Why Are Uyghurs in Turkey Targeted?

According to testimonies and investigation files obtained by DW, China views Turkey not just as a nation hosting a large population of Uyghur Turks, but as one of the operational epicenters of diaspora networks operating between Europe and the Middle East.

Consequently, the investigations allege that China attempts to closely monitor individuals who are active in civil society, engage in media production, work in the field of human rights, or bring the East Turkestan issue to international platforms.

The ICIJ’s China Targets investigation reveals a similar pattern. According to the research, China’s transnational repression strategy is not confined to the physical repatriation of specific individuals; it also aims to weaken the organizational capacity of diaspora communities, disrupt the environment of trust, and instill a persistent sense of surveillance within the community.

“Either Provide Information, or Your Family Pays the Price”

One of the most remarkable sections of the DW investigation was the testimonies regarding the mechanism of pressure allegedly established through family members in China.

Speaking to the investigation, some Uyghurs claimed that Chinese security officers interrogated their relatives, blocked their passport applications, threatened them with detention, or contacted them to demand information from their kin abroad.

According to the shared testimonies, the targeted individuals were given a direct message: “We hold your family. If you do not cooperate, they will suffer the consequences.”

Human rights experts assess that this method establishes a control mechanism based on psychological pressure and coercion, extending far beyond conventional intelligence gathering.

Allegations of Creating an Informant Network

In police investigation files and witness statements obtained by DW, allegations surfaced that certain individuals were offered money in exchange for gathering intelligence on Uyghurs in Turkey.

According to the research, the targeted individuals were allegedly asked to report on:

The activities carried out by specific Uyghur associations,
The identities of individuals attending meetings and events,
The journalists being interviewed,
The activists who come to the forefront,
The families engaged in anti-China activities.

According to the claims reflected in the investigation files, these intelligence-gathering activities were not limited to political activists alone, but extended to a broad circle ranging from students to businesspeople.

These allegations featured in the investigations have triggered a profound climate of mistrust within the Uyghur diaspora in Turkey. Some civil society representatives expressed that the anxiety of “who might be passing information?” has become widespread among community members.

Conversations Reflected in Police Statements

The investigation files reviewed by DW also included the police statements of certain individuals alleged to be suspects.

According to the files, while some suspects denied the charges of gathering information on behalf of China, other statements showed that they admitted to establishing contact with officials in China but argued that this did not fall within the scope of espionage activities.

Some communication records reflected in the investigations allegedly contained information requests regarding specific individuals in Turkey, photographs, address information, and notes concerning social circles. However, as all these records are the subject of ongoing judicial processes, the final legal assessment rests with the relevant courts.

Espionage Investigations in Turkey

During the period when the DW investigation was published, it was reflected in the Turkish public domain that various judicial investigations were being conducted regarding allegations of espionage on behalf of China.

In these investigations, it was alleged that certain suspects collected information on Uyghur Turks living in Turkey, recorded personal data, and transferred this information to individuals or institutions claimed to be linked to Chinese intelligence.

While these accusations, featured in indictments prepared by Turkish prosecutors, remain under review by judicial authorities, it must be remembered that the presumption of innocence remains valid for cases without finalized convictions.

Findings Consistent with the ICIJ’s Global Pattern

These allegations in Turkey bear striking similarities to the global pattern revealed in the ICIJ’s China Targets investigation.

According to the dossier prepared by the ICIJ after reviewing hundreds of documents, court records, and international research, China’s transnational repression model does not consist of Interpol Red Notices alone. The research demonstrates that numerous methods—such as exerting pressure on the families of targeted individuals, monitoring diaspora communities, attempting to create informant networks, utilizing economic and psychological coercion, and forcing individuals to return to China under the guise of voluntariness—are deployed in tandem.

The testimonies obtained by DW in Turkey and the allegations reflected in judicial investigations show significant overlap with the model described in international research. Nonetheless, because a major portion of these claims relies on ongoing or past judicial proceedings, it remains legally critical that each dossier be evaluated within the framework of its own evidence and court rulings.

The emerging picture indicates that China’s activities in Turkey are not confined solely to diplomatic maneuvers or extradition requests; serious allegations regarding systematic information gathering and attempts to influence the diaspora are also documented in international research and judicial records.

Paid Informants: Allegations Targeting Trust Within the Diaspora

One of the most sensitive and controversial topics regarding China’s transnational repression mechanism is the allegation that Uyghurs living abroad are directed to gather intelligence within their own communities. This subject has been reflected not only in individual testimonies but also in judicial investigation files, police reports reviewed by Deutsche Welle (DW), and findings from international investigative journalism projects.

However, it is crucial to emphasize that a significant portion of the information under this heading relies on judicial investigations, witness statements, and journalistic research; the final legal evaluation for each concrete case rests with independent courts.

The Claim of Monetary Offers in Exchange for Information

According to the allegations in the investigation files obtained by DW, some Uyghur Turks living in Turkey were offered financial benefits in exchange for gathering intelligence on other Uyghurs.

Based on police records and witness narratives included in the research, individuals asked to provide information were allegedly requested to collect data specifically on:

The activities of Uyghur associations,
Individuals participating in meetings and events,
Human rights defenders,
Journalists,
Student groups,
Businesspeople,
Individuals making anti-China statements,
Connections with Uyghur organizations abroad.

The investigation documents contained claims that payments were offered to certain individuals in exchange for regularly transmitting this information. However, it should also be noted that these allegations are subject to judicial processes, and each file involves distinct evaluations of evidence.

Coercion Exerted Through Families

One of the most striking aspects of the DW investigation was that monetary offers were rarely used in isolation; they were accompanied by allegations of pressure exerted through family members living in China.

Speaking to the investigation, some Uyghurs claimed that their relatives in China were interrogated by security units, their passport applications were blocked, their freedom of movement was restricted, or they faced various administrative sanctions.

In some testimonies, it was alleged that the following message was indirectly conveyed to individuals in Turkey: “If you cooperate, your family will live in peace. If you refuse, they may face the consequences.”

According to human rights experts, such methods are classified among transnational repression techniques aimed at steering individuals toward cooperation by generating psychological pressure, rather than relying directly on physical force.

Allegations of Links to the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS)

In the investigation files reviewed by DW, it was asserted that some suspects acted on behalf of individuals linked to the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS).

Certain indictments prepared by Turkish prosecutors alleged that the suspects transferred the information they gathered about Uyghurs in Turkey to individuals or entities claimed to be connected with Chinese intelligence.

However, an important legal distinction exists at this juncture: prosecutorial claims reflect the accusations brought in an indictment; their veracity can only be finalized through a court ruling. Therefore, the presumption of innocence maintains its validity for individuals who have not been convicted by a finalized judgment.

The “Monitor One Another” Allegation

Another notable element in the research was the claim that targeted individuals were directed not only to provide information but also to actively monitor their own social circles and other Uyghurs.

According to testimonies relayed by DW, certain individuals were allegedly asked to track and regularly share information regarding:

Who visits which associations,
Who organizes meetings,
Who establishes contact with organizations abroad,
Who meets with the media,
Who engages in activities criticizing the Chinese administration.

These allegations are evaluated as a method aiming not only to collect intelligence but also to systematically generate mistrust within the diaspora community. Some Uyghurs speaking to the investigations stated that, over time, people became unable to trust one another, participation in social activities dwindled, and a persistent anxiety of being watched emerged within the community.

Reflection of the Global Model in Turkey

The ICIJ’s China Targets investigation demonstrates that these allegations raised in Turkey are not isolated incidents; testimonies regarding similar methods have been recorded across various countries in Europe, North America, and Asia.

According to the research, one of the primary objectives in China’s transnational repression strategy is not just to target specific individuals, but to weaken internal solidarity within diaspora communities and create a pervasive perception of surveillance. In this context, monetary offers, pressure allegedly exerted through family members, intelligence-gathering initiatives, and claims of recruiting informants from within the community are viewed as complementary components of the same strategy.

While investigations carried out in Turkey and international journalistic research bring these allegations to the public agenda, it remains legally paramount that each event subject to the files be evaluated by independent judicial authorities within the framework of its own evidence.

What Do Police Records Reveal? Findings Reflected in Investigation Files

Some of the most concrete public information regarding China’s activities in Turkey has been obtained from police briefs, indictments, and court files prepared within the scope of judicial investigations conducted by Turkish prosecutors. These documents were previously reviewed and reported by Deutsche Welle (DW), and brought to public attention alongside international investigative journalism efforts.

The information presented in this section consists solely of reports on the allegations contained in the aforementioned judicial documents. The charges mentioned in the files are the subject of the respective investigations and judicial processes. The presumption of innocence remains fully valid for individuals without finalized convictions.

Allegations Contained in Statements

In certain statement transcripts reflected in the investigation files, it was alleged that suspects collected information on Uyghur Turks living in Turkey.

According to police records, the investigations asserted that the following types of information were gathered:

The activities of Uyghur non-governmental organizations,
The residential addresses of specific individuals,
Telephone numbers and contact information,
Names of individuals participating in meetings and events,
International connections,
Social media activities,
Political and human rights advocacy work.

In some statements, allegations that the information in question was forwarded to third parties became the subject of investigation. While some of the suspects denied these accusations, others admitted to establishing contact with certain individuals but argued that this did not constitute espionage activity.

Findings Regarding Financial Transfers

One of the notable topics in the investigation files was the examination of financial movements.

According to judicial documents, bank transactions, wire transfers, and financial operations belonging to certain suspects were analyzed within the scope of the investigation. Claims featured in prosecutorial files assessed that specific monetary movements could be linked to intelligence-gathering activities.

Consequently, the investigations subjected the following to scrutiny:

Bank account movements,
International wire transfers,
Cash payments,
Financial transactions allegedly executed through intermediaries.

However, it is understood that these financial data in the files are not treated as conclusive evidence of a crime on their own; instead, they are evaluated by judicial authorities in conjunction with other evidence.

Communication Records

Another critical heading in the police briefs was communication records.

According to the investigation files, certain digital materials, phone calls, and electronic correspondence obtained by judicial authorities were taken under review.

The documents allege that a portion of these records contained content such as:

Information requests regarding specific individuals,
Sharing of photographs and addresses,
Meeting details,
Individuals requested to be surveilled,
Targets to be contacted.

While prosecutorial authorities evaluated these records among the evidence of the investigation, the suspects argued that this correspondence was conducted for different purposes. The final assessment was left to the discretion of the relevant courts.

Operational Framework

Analyses included in the investigation files also featured the claim that information-gathering activities were carried out within a specific organizational structure rather than through individual initiatives.

The police briefs outlined the following operational flow chart in summary:

Identification of targeted individuals living in Turkey,
Collection of personal and social data regarding these individuals,
Digital transmission of the gathered information to designated contact points,
Utilization of the acquired data to identify new target individuals,
Periodic repetition of this cycle.

Investigative authorities assessed that this structure formed a systematic intelligence-gathering network. In response, certain suspects named in the file rejected the charges against them, arguing that their activities did not constitute a crime.

The Collective Picture Presented by the Documents

When prosecutorial files, police briefs, and evidence submitted to the courts are evaluated collectively, the core of the investigations centers on the allegation that information was gathered regarding the Uyghur diaspora living in Turkey.

The prominent topics emerging from the documents reflected in the files include:

Detailed intelligence profiling of specific individuals,
Communication records and digital correspondence,
Scrutiny of financial movements,
Witness and suspect statements,
Allegations regarding the sharing of personal data,
A communication network allegedly operating in a coordinated manner.

While these documents form the basis of the judicial investigations conducted in Turkey, they also bear striking similarities to the findings regarding the transnational surveillance model revealed in Deutsche Welle’s and the ICIJ’s China Targets investigations. Nonetheless, the authority for the final legal evaluation regarding each allegation in the judicial files rests with independent Turkish courts, and finalized judicial rulings must be taken as the basis. While these findings reflected in police records and investigation files provide a significant framework regarding China’s activities in Turkey, another dimension of the debate consists of how Ankara approaches these processes.

Turkey’s Extradition Policy: A Delicate Balance Between Diplomatic Pressure and International Law

Extradition requests made by China to Turkey in recent years have become one of the most controversial topics—not only in bilateral diplomatic relations but also in international human rights law. Requests directed particularly at Uyghur Turks are evaluated within the framework of international conventions ratified by Turkey, constitutional provisions, and high court rulings, while the policy pursued by Ankara to date has been closely monitored by the international community.

While China cites grounds such as “terrorism,” “separatism,” or “crimes against state security” for a significant portion of the individuals whose extradition it demands from Turkey, human rights organizations have warned that most of these accusations are political in nature. They caution that the individuals concerned could face risks of torture, arbitrary detention, or unfair trial if returned to China.

Consequently, extradition processes carried out in Turkey have been addressed not only within the scope of criminal law but also in terms of the right to life, the prohibition of torture, and the principle of non-refoulement.

The 2017 Turkey-China Extradition Treaty

The “Extradition Treaty” between China and Turkey was signed on May 13, 2017.

The treaty aimed to establish the legal framework for the mutual extradition of individuals wanted for specific crimes between the two nations. While the Beijing administration ratified the agreement that same year, the process unfolded differently for Turkey.

For the treaty to take effect, it had to be deemed appropriate by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) and approved by the President. However, despite the years that have passed, the treaty has not been approved by the TBMM General Assembly and has not entered into force.

This state of affairs has remained one of the most closely followed issues, particularly among Uyghurs living in the East Turkestan diaspora.

Why Was the TBMM Process Not Completed?

Official authorities have not disclosed a single, definitive reason for the treaty not entering into force in Turkey. However, various assessments have been made in the public sphere and legal circles throughout the process.

The first of these was the obligations arising from international human rights treaties to which Turkey is a party. The United Nations Convention Against Torture, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and constitutional provisions regarding fundamental rights subject the return of individuals to countries where they face a risk of torture or ill-treatment to strict judicial scrutiny.

The second critical element was the evaluation by international human rights organizations that certain files prepared by China, particularly regarding Uyghurs, “carried a political character.” Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and various United Nations rapporteurs have highlighted allegations of torture, arbitrary detentions, and the violation of the right to a fair trial in their reports on China’s practices in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

This picture led to intense debates regarding the potential consequences of implementing the extradition treaty under international law.

The Approach of the Constitutional Court

One of the institutions playing a decisive role in extradition and deportation processes concerning China in Turkey has been the Constitutional Court (AYM).

In various files reviewed within the scope of individual applications, the AYM issued interim injunctions, taking into account allegations that sending individuals to China could cause irreparable harm regarding the right to life and the prohibition of torture.

The following principles particularly stood out in the Court’s rulings:

Protection of the right to life,
The absolute prohibition of torture and ill-treatment,
The right to an effective remedy,
Keeping deportation procedures open to judicial review,
Evaluating each application according to its individual circumstances.

In these rulings, the AYM took into account not only domestic law but also international conventions to which Turkey is a party and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). This approach demonstrated that files originating from China are not evaluated automatically, but are examined within the concrete circumstances of each case.

Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights

One of the most critical legal foundations shaping Turkey’s extradition policy has been the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).

According to the established case law of the ECHR, a state cannot deport a person to a country where they face a serious threat to their right to life or a risk of:

Torture,
Inhuman or degrading treatment,
Arbitrary arrest,
An unfair trial.

In making this assessment, the Court looks not only at the criminal accusation but also at the general human rights situation in the destination country and the individual risk of the applicant. This principle is recognized as one of the most critical applications of the non-refoulement rule in international law.

Therefore, every extradition request arriving from China must be evaluated not only in terms of diplomatic relations between the two countries, but also regarding the protection standards mandated by European human rights law.

Has Turkey Ever Extradited Anyone to China to Date?

When publicly available official information and judicial rulings issued to date are taken into account, there is no confirmed instance of Turkey directly executing an extradition to China in files involving Uyghur Turks that are known to the public and have been the subject of judicial proceedings.

Nonetheless, human rights organizations have reported instances where certain Uyghurs were allegedly sent to China via third countries, sparks of which triggered international debates. However, each of these cases is evaluated within its own distinct legal and factual circumstances and is not classified as a direct judicial extradition executed by Turkey to China.

On the other hand, there have been individuals in Turkey who were detained or subjected to deportation procedures at various periods in line with China’s extradition requests; however, a significant portion of these processes could not be finalized due to Constitutional Court rulings, stay-of-execution orders by administrative courts, or international protection mechanisms.

Legal Balance vs. Geopolitical Balance

Turkey’s extradition policy toward China is not merely a legal matter; it forms a multi-layered balancing act that simultaneously encompasses dimensions of foreign policy, security, and human rights.

On one side of the scale lie demands for counter-terrorism and international judicial cooperation, while on the other side stand fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, the European Convention on Human Rights, United Nations conventions, and the principle of non-refoulement.

The picture that has emerged to date demonstrates that Turkey does not automatically fulfill extradition requests arriving from China. Instead, each file is examined individually by judicial authorities, with international obligations regarding the right to life and the prohibition of torture playing a decisive role.

China’s Turkey Model: Local Application of a Global Coercion Mechanism

The Interpol Red Notices, Operation Fox Hunt, the Sky Net program, covert extraterritorial coercion methods, and international law debates explored in previous sections of this series have revealed that China’s cross-border operations are not conducted via a single tool. The Turkey dossier stands out as one of the most compelling examples showcasing the field reflections of this global strategy.

The China Targets and China Cables investigations by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) reveal that China deploys a complementary, multi-layered model targeting individuals living abroad. Court files made public in Turkey, Deutsche Welle investigations, and international human rights reports point to a picture that largely aligns with this model.

When analyzed collectively, the examined documents and research demonstrate that China’s operational framework in Turkey does not rely on a single method, but rather consists of an integrated structure based on the simultaneous deployment of legal, diplomatic, psychological, and intelligence components.

1. Interpol: Strategic Exploitation of Legal Mechanisms

The first pillar of the model consists of international judicial cooperation mechanisms. As analyzed in detail in previous chapters, China made attempts to secure Interpol Red Notices against certain Uyghur activists, businesspeople, and dissidents. According to the ICIJ’s China Targets investigation, in certain files, these notices functioned not merely for apprehension purposes, but as a tool to restrict the targeted individuals’ freedom of movement and generate international pressure. The Abdulkadir Yapçan dossier stands out as one of the longest-running examples of this strategy in Turkey.

2. Diplomatic Pressure and Extradition Requests

Research indicates that the Interpol mechanism is never used in isolation. Alongside it, bilateral diplomatic meetings, formal extradition requests, mutual legal assistance initiatives, and security cooperation talks are utilized as instruments driven toward the same objective. The extradition treaty signed between Turkey and China in 2017 was a major piece of this diplomatic framework. However, the treaty’s failure to enter into force in Turkey, combined with the high judiciary’s human rights-centric rulings, prevented the unrestricted implementation of this mechanism.

3. Psychological Coercion via Family Members

A heading that features consistently across investigations by the ICIJ, DW, and various human rights organizations is the coercion mechanism allegedly established through family members living in China. According to testimonies included in the research, methods such as interrogating relatives, blocking passport procedures, threatening detention, and communication pressure are deployed to influence the behavior of individuals living abroad. This method is evaluated as a control mechanism rooted in psychological pressure rather than direct physical force.

4. Economic Leverage and Financial Tools

International research indicates that economic instruments are also utilized as part of the transnational repression strategy. In certain cases, the termination of commercial relations, targeting of corporate activities, transactions regarding assets, financial pressures, and monetary offers can be deployed within the same overarching process. The fact that financial transfers and monetary movements have been subjected to scrutiny in certain investigations conducted in Turkey shows that this dimension has also been reflected in judicial files.

5. Diaspora Surveillance

Another prominent element in the research is the allegation that diaspora communities are systematically monitored. In investigation files obtained by DW and global research by the ICIJ, claims surfaced regarding attempts to gather intelligence on association activities, human rights advocacy, media production, social media posts, meetings, and international connections. According to human rights experts, this method aims not only to acquire data but also to instill a persistent perception of surveillance within the diaspora.

6. Attempts to Cultivate Informant Networks

Inquiry files in Turkey and DW investigations brought to light allegations that certain individuals acting on behalf of China attempted to gather information on other Uyghurs. The research asserts that through methods such as monetary offers, family pressure, and relationships established via social circles, certain individuals were steered toward sharing information. The ICIJ’s China Targets investigation notes that similar methods are observed not only in Turkey but also across diaspora communities living in various other countries.

7. Transnational Police Cooperation Initiatives

Another notable element in China’s global strategy is the attempt to utilize international police cooperation mechanisms alongside broader security policies. Interpol, bilateral security agreements, mutual legal assistance processes, and information-sharing requests emerge as parts of this framework. However, international law experts emphasize that these mechanisms must not be exploited for political purposes; otherwise, both the credibility of the international police cooperation system and human rights protection mechanisms risk severe damage.

The Overarching Picture Presented by the Turkey Dossier

When the court rulings, international investigations, human rights reports, and journalistic works analyzed throughout this series are evaluated together, it becomes evident that the picture emerging in Turkey is inextricably linked to China’s global transnational repression strategy.

The ICIJ’s China Targets and China Cables investigations reveal that the Beijing administration does not merely aim to physically repatriate individuals abroad; it deploys a multi-layered model designed to keep them under constant surveillance, restrict their sphere of movement, complicate their international travel, place pressure on their social circles, and weaken the organizational capacity of diaspora communities.

Similar elements command attention in the examples examined in Turkey:

Interpol Red Notices,
Diplomatic initiatives and extradition requests,
Coercion allegedly exerted through family members,
Claims of intelligence gathering within the diaspora,
Attempts to cultivate informant networks,
Communication and financial movements reflected in judicial investigations.

While each file must be evaluated within its own unique legal parameters, the collective pattern revealed by international research indicates that these tools are used not independently, but as complementary components of the exact same strategy.

The Empire Beyond the Red Notice

The most critical conclusion emerging across the six parts of this series is that the Interpol Red Notice is merely one of the many tools deployed in China’s global transnational operations. International research, court records, and human rights reports demonstrate that diplomacy, economic leverage, psychological methods enacted via families, diaspora surveillance, intelligence gathering, and international security cooperation mechanisms are evaluated collectively as parts of Beijing’s broader strategy of transnational influence.

The case of Turkey stands out as one of the most remarkable laboratories of this global model. On one side stands a state activating international legal mechanisms and pursuing extradition requests; on the other side stand national and international judicial bodies rendering decisions on the bedrock of the right to life, the prohibition of torture, and the principle of non-refoulement.

This dynamic is evaluated as a vital case study demonstrating not only the trajectory of relations between Turkey and China, but also how international law, state sovereignty, and cross-border human rights protection mechanisms are being tested in the 21st century.

Why is İstanbul Critical for Beijing?

When analyzing China’s cross-border activities, it becomes evident that İstanbul is not merely Turkey’s largest metropolis, but also one of the international diaspora centers closely monitored by the Beijing administration.

According to international human rights organizations, academic studies, and journalistic inquiries, Turkey hosts one of the largest Uyghur populations living outside of China. While precise official statistics are non-existent, various studies estimate the Uyghur population residing in Turkey to be in the tens of thousands, with some assessments reaching approximately 50,000 individuals. A significant portion of this population maintains their lives in İstanbul.

İstanbul’s strategic significance for China is driven by more than just population size. The city simultaneously stands out as one of the most critical hubs where:

Uyghur non-governmental organizations operate,
International media outlets can access firsthand news sources,
Human rights defenders carry out their advocacy work,
Meetings and conferences focused on East Turkestan are organized,
Diaspora networks intersecting Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia converge.

The ICIJ’s China Targets investigation reveals that China’s transnational repression strategy does not merely target specific individuals; it also aims to control the organizational capacity, information flow, and international visibility of diaspora communities. Within this framework, Beijing views İstanbul not just as a city harboring a vast number of Uyghurs, but as a critical node where activities capable of shaping international public opinion are conducted.

Furthermore, investigations published by Deutsche Welle convey that allegations regarding attempts to surveil certain Uyghurs in Turkey, gather intelligence within the community, and exert pressure through family members have been reflected particularly in İstanbul-based inquiries. This explaining why İstanbul is frequently cited in international research regarding China’s cross-border activities.

From a geopolitical standpoint, Turkey serves as a natural transit gateway between Asia and Europe, while simultaneously positioning itself as a NATO member, a key diplomatic actor, and a nation with which the Uyghur diaspora historically shares its strongest bonds. Consequently, China’s policies toward Turkey are evaluated not merely within the context of bilateral relations, but as part of a broader global security and diaspora strategy.

The example of İstanbul provides an essential framework for understanding why the Interpol applications, extradition requests, surveillance allegations, and informant network initiatives examined in this dossier are heavily concentrated in Turkey. In this regard, the city stands out as one of the most striking field examples of the transnational repression model described in the ICIJ’s China Targets investigation.

Espionage Operations in Turkey: Claims Reflected in Investigation Files

For many years, international debates surrounding China’s transnational operations primarily focused on examples in Europe, North America, and Australia. However, judicial investigations conducted in Turkey in recent years have brought this discussion directly onto the Turkish national agenda.

Specifically, within the scope of İstanbul-based investigations, prosecutorial indictments and police briefs featured allegations that personal data regarding Uyghur Turks living in Turkey was collected, specific individuals were surveilled, and this intelligence may have been transferred to individuals or entities claimed to be linked to China.

While these files were reviewed and relayed to the international community by Deutsche Welle (DW), they were assessed to bear striking similarities to the global model of transnational repression uncovered in the ICIJ’s China Targets investigation.

İstanbul-Based Inquiries

According to judicial documents made public, Turkish security units conducted investigations at various times regarding intelligence-gathering activities allegedly linked to China.

The claims included in the prosecutorial files involved matters such as:

Gathering the identity information of Uyghur Turks living in Turkey,
Recording their residential addresses,
Sharing their telephone numbers and contact information,
Monitoring association activities,
Reporting on meetings and events,
Transferring personal photographs and digital data.

The indictments asserted that these activities were aimed at systematically monitoring a specific community living in Turkey. In response, the defendants denied the charges against them or provided alternative explanations. The final evaluation remains within the jurisdiction of the relevant courts.

Claims Targeting Uyghurs

According to the investigation files, the vast majority of the individuals about whom information was allegedly gathered consisted of Uyghur Turks.

The prosecutorial documents showed that the names of human rights defenders, journalists, civil society representatives, businesspeople, and individuals active on the East Turkestan issue were evaluated within the scope of the investigation.

These findings align closely with assertions made in international research indicating that China closely monitors the Uyghur diaspora abroad.

Findings Reflected in Prosecutorial and Court Documents

The allegations contained in the publicly accessible judicial documents are summarized under the following headings:

Intelligence profiling of specific individuals,
Digital communication records,
Scrutiny of financial movements,
Witness and suspect statements,
Claims regarding the unauthorized sharing of personal data,
Assessments that coordinated intelligence-gathering activities were conducted.

While these documents form the bedrock of the investigations pursued in Turkey, it must be kept in mind that each claim is evaluated by independent courts within the framework of evidence, and the presumption of innocence remains fully valid for files without finalized convictions.

Similarities Between the Global Model and Turkey

When the ICIJ’s China Targets investigation, the China Cables documents, and various international human rights reports are analyzed collectively, certain recurring methods regarding China’s cross-border activities command attention. These include:

The utilization of international judicial mechanisms,
Diplomatic interventions,
Monitoring of diaspora communities,
Allegations of pressure exerted through family members,
Attempts to gather intelligence and cultivate informant networks,
Practices aimed at restricting the sphere of movement of targeted individuals.

The investigations carried out in Turkey and the judicial documents reflected in the public domain have caused this global pattern to be debated in the context of Turkey as well. This dynamic transforms the Turkey dossier into a vital field of analysis—not only from a national security or criminal law perspective but also in terms of states’ transnational influence activities and international human rights law.

East Turkestan Bulletin News Agency / NEWS CENTER

REFERENCES

1. International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ)

China Targets – Inside China’s Global Campaign to Silence Dissent

https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-targets/

An international investigative journalism project examining China’s transnational repression strategies, overseas surveillance activities, and efforts to target dissidents and diaspora communities around the world.

2. ICIJ – Interpol Red Notice Investigation

Chinese Authorities Exploited Interpol to Pursue Overseas Targets

https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-targets/interpol-red-notice-police-warrant-jack-ma/

An investigation into China’s alleged use of Interpol Red Notices, including the case of Abdulkadir Yapchan and broader concerns regarding political misuse of international policing mechanisms.

3. Deutsche Welle (DW)

DW Investigations – China, Uyghurs and Transnational Repression

https://www.dw.com/en/top-stories/s-9097

Investigative reporting on China’s activities targeting Uyghur communities abroad, including surveillance allegations, intelligence gathering, and court cases in Turkey.

4. United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)

Assessment of Human Rights Concerns in Xinjiang

https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements/2022/08/ohchr-assessment-human-rights-concerns-xinjiang-uyghur-autonomous-region-peoples-republic-china

The UN assessment documenting allegations of serious human rights violations against Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim minorities in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

5. INTERPOL

Official INTERPOL Website

https://www.interpol.int/

Official information regarding INTERPOL’s Red Notice system, international police cooperation, and legal framework.

6. Constitutional Court of the Republic of Türkiye

Case Law Database

https://kararlarbilgibankasi.anayasa.gov.tr/

Official database containing Constitutional Court decisions, including individual applications concerning extradition and deportation cases.

7. European Court of Human Rights (HUDOC)

HUDOC Database

https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/

Official database of the European Court of Human Rights containing judgments concerning extradition, deportation, torture risk, and the principle of non-refoulement.

8. United Nations Convention Against Torture

Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-against-torture-and-other-cruel-inhuman-or-degrading-treatment-or-punishment

The international treaty prohibiting the transfer of individuals to countries where they face a substantial risk of torture.