Pazartesi , Temmuz 20 2026
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UNIFORM-LESS OCCUPATION: BEIJING AND MOSCOW’S NEXT-GENERATION SHADOW ARMIES – PART 17: The China Factor in Africa’s New Security Architecture

“While Russia enters the heart of Africa with heavy weaponry, mercenaries, and bloody dawn operations, Beijing advances with a quiet, uniformless, and far more insidious doctrine: contracts, cameras, artificial intelligence, and logistical networks. While Wagner fires boots-on-the-ground bullets to directly reshape regimes, China’s ‘shadow armies’ are gathering the keys to the strategic mines, ports, and railways behind those very frontlines. Quietly taking root in nearly 30 countries across Africa, binding local police forces to their own chain of command, and forging digital shackles under the guise of ‘Safe Cities,’ this new-generation Chinese model is subtly reshaping the continent’s security architecture. Here is the behind-the-scenes look at microscopic lenses hidden behind gun barrels, a quietly established security-logistics empire, and Beijing’s doctrine of conflict-free occupation in Africa…”

Is the Chinese Model Spreading?

While Russia enters the heart of Africa with heavy weapons and direct military interventions, Beijing advances with a quiet, uniformless, and commercially oriented doctrine. The presence of Chinese Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) on the African continent has gained serious momentum, particularly with the Belt and Road Initiative launched in 2013. Today, it is estimated that more than 20 China-based security companies operate in nearly 30 African countries.

However, unlike their Russian counterparts, Chinese companies do not assume direct combat roles in high-risk conflict zones like Mali or the Central African Republic. Instead, they mostly fall into the “Class 2” category—companies providing niche resources. These firms focus on commercial services such as risk assessment, training local personnel, and protecting Chinese investments.

The spread of the Chinese model largely parallels the geographic distribution of its economic interests. Especially in countries with a dense Chinese diaspora, such as South Africa and Angola, alternative “joint defense” platforms and diaspora-based security models supported by local communities and embassies are developing.

Conversely, strict domestic firearms control legislation in China limits the ability of company personnel to carry or use weapons in overseas countries, making it difficult for this model to fully compete at a military level with Western or Russian rivals. Consequently, the Chinese model is spreading rapidly across the continent, but this expansion shapes up as a “guarantor of economic interest protection” rather than a geopolitical military intervention.

Local Police Training

Beijing attaches great importance to training local law enforcement agencies in order to increase its influence in Africa and to localize Chinese-style security governance standards. The Chinese Ministry of Public Security can directly delegate the training of local police to Chinese private security companies to ensure the safety of critical projects. This context allows Chinese firms to become operational actors in managing local security forces.

The most concrete implementations on the continent are as follows:

  • The Kenya Example: Within the scope of securing the Mombasa–Nairobi railway line, a company named DeWe Security undertook the coordination of approximately 1,500 armed Kenyan police officers and played a direct role in training local railway police forces.

  • Anbang Save-Guard Group: Partnering with the Zhejiang Police Academy, the company organized extensive security seminars for groups that included 35 high-ranking military officials from 21 French-speaking African countries.

  • The Guinea Example: Operating in the country, Cross Ocean Security (COS) provided local personnel with training in riot control and counter-terrorism techniques following the deterioration of the local security situation.

These training activities represent a structural strategy aimed at prioritizing the protection of Chinese interests in the long run by ensuring the socialization of local African elites.

Technology Transfer

One of the most distinctive and transformative aspects of the Chinese security model is that it goes beyond traditional physical protection methods to include an intensive transfer of technology. In military and security seminars organized across Africa, Chinese companies market smart teller management, intelligent traffic control, “Smart City,” and “Safe City” models, exporting China’s experience in this field to the continent.

This technological expansion runs fully integrated with the efforts of Chinese technology giants like Huawei, Hikvision, and Dahua to expand their digital surveillance infrastructure in Africa. In fact, traditional private security companies in the Chinese market have entered into fierce competition with Chinese technology firms that are aggressively entering the risk analysis and technical security segments. Thanks to this technology transfer, Beijing shapes the digital backbone of Africa’s security architecture according to its own surveillance and security standards.

Long-Term Goals

Behind the moves China carries out in Africa through private security companies lie multi-layered, long-term goals aimed at designing not just the present but also the future:

  • Securing Economic and Strategic Interests: Keeping the security of approximately 1.2 million Chinese citizens living in Africa, as well as mining sites, ports, oil pipelines, and billion-dollar infrastructure projects, under direct control without leaving them to the “inadequacies of local authorities”.

  • Expanding the Regime’s Extraterritorial Sphere of Influence: Increasing Beijing’s extraterritorial power through these companies, which have organic links with the state apparatus and intelligence structures, and consolidating control over the Chinese diaspora in Africa.

  • Spreading Chinese Security Governance Standards: Establishing authoritarian and technological security norms—such as China’s “Safe City”—instead of Western institutional models to build local security structures dependent on them over the long term.

  • Establishing an Integrated Security-Logistics Empire: As clearly demonstrated in the case of Frontier Services Group (FSG), the goal is to develop a multi-faceted, hybrid influence model by combining security services with logistics, insurance, and mining activities (such as strategic mining operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo).

EDITOR’S NOTE

One of the most mysterious moves of modern geopolitics is being carried out by the new-generation ShadowArmies rising on the continent. While Russia advances with firepower on the ground, the Beijing administration deploys ChinaPMSC (Private Security Companies) structures for a much more strategic purpose. This transformation in the heart of Africa is not merely an economic move, but a global doctrine directly redesigning the architecture of AfricaSecurity. Under the guise of protecting its multi-billion-dollar investments under the BeltandRoad initiative, China exports TechnoAuthoritarianism to the continent. The most concrete examples of this appear as firms like DeWeSecurity bind local security forces to their own chain of command, alongside the rapid proliferation of AI-powered SafeCities projects. Going beyond traditional military presence, this DigitalSurveillance network combines with the logistics and security empires of giant entities like FrontierServicesGroup to present us with a modern model of HybridOccupation. While the Western world tries to make sense of this insidious strategy, the GeopoliticalSurveillance mechanism established by Beijing aims to control the future understanding of ExtraterritorialSecurity and the destiny of the continent from a single center.

REFERENCE:

Report Title: Russia and Chinese private military and security companies in Africa: two competing models? Authors: Djenabou Cissé, Simon Menet, Marie de Vries (Researchers at the Foundation for Strategic Research)

Publisher: FRS (Fondation pour la recherche stratégique / Foundation for Strategic Research – Paris) Publication Date / No: No. 03/2025 – March 2025

East Turkestan Bulletin News Agency / NEWS CENTER

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